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Lessons from the Ottoman Harem 
(On Ethnicity, Religion and War)
*
 
The Ottoman Empire had a profound impact in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa at 
the apogee of its power, covering the era between 1453 C. E. and 1699 C. E. In this paper, I 
exploit the empire’s unique culture and institutions to examine the roles of ethnicity and 
religion in conflict and war. Based on one theory, the Ottoman conquests were driven by the 
Gaza ideology according to which the empire’s central motivation was provided by a spirit of 
Holy War in the name of Islam. This is generally emphasized as the reason why the 
Ottomans initiated more conflicts in the West, and why on the eastern fronts, more conflicts 
were started by its rivals. Another not necessarily mutually exclusive theory claims that the 
Imperial Harem wielded considerable political power in Ottoman affairs. Accordingly, the 
members of the Harem with different ethnic or religious backgrounds often lobbied the Sultan 
to influence the geography of Ottoman conquests. Using comprehensive data on Ottoman 
wars and conflicts between 1401 C. E. and 1700 C. E., I document that Ottoman conquests 
were concentrated in the West throughout the mid-16th century. Then, I show that the ethnic 
background of Valide Sultan (the queen mother) was an important and independent 
determinant of whether the empire engaged in military conquests in Europe, North Africa or 
the Middle East. Depending on the empirical specification, the reign of a sultan with a 
European maternal genealogy was enough to offset more than 70 percent of the empire’s 
western orientation in imperial conquests. Still, these findings do not rule out the possibility 
that the sultans’ ethnic and cultural heritages – but not the politics of the queen mothers or 
their Harems – influenced Ottoman conquests. 
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What determines war and peace? And how important have religion, ethnicity and state
ideology been for conﬂict historically? In a variety of forms and contexts, these two
questions have long intrigued political scientists and economists alike.
The conventional studies of conﬂict and war overwhelmingly, if not solely, empha-
size diﬀerences between social groups. This is primarily due to a tendency to think of
religion, ethnicity and culture within the context of “club theories” by which diﬀerences
in identity produce wholesale “clash of civilizations”.1 Accordingly, religiously-motivated
wars are primarily about societies and not their rulers. Political leaders’ motives for war
and peace have been studied quite extensively in more contemporary political economy
contexts.2 Nonetheless, the degree to which rulers themselves are driven by religious
motives or the extent to which their own preferences, identities as well as political and
cultural ties inﬂuence the patterns of international war has never been examined. A
serious impediment to such an empirical investigation has been the diﬃculty to observe
variations in the rulers’ ethnic or religious identities independently of those of their own
societies at large.
Ottoman history is relevant for this quest for at least three reasons. First, the
empire had a profound and lasting impact in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa,
especially during the apogee of its power between the 15th and 17th centuries. Most
of the Balkans and eastern Europe remained under Ottoman imperial rule for centuries
and many countries there today reﬂect the remnants of various institutional features
inherited from the Ottomans.
Second, some historians share the view that the Ottomans were motivated by the
Gaza ideology, at least during the empire’s early era running through the end of the
16th century. They state Gaza as the reason why the empire steadily looked westward
for expansion driven by religious motives. As analyzed by Paul Wittek and noted by
Kafadar (1996, p. 11) “what fueled the energies of the early Ottoman conquerors was
essentially their commitment to Gaza, an ‘ideology of Holy War’ in the name of Islam.
Ottoman power was built on that commitment...” Hence, to the extent that this view
accurately describes the Ottomans’ imperial predisposition and their geopolitical objec-
tives, it provides a useful yardstick with which we can gauge and quantify the inﬂuence
of other relevant determinants of conﬂict and war.
Third, within a fairly swift period of time following its foundation, the empire
became a multi-ethnic and multi-religious civilization with many important posts within
1For the club theory of religion, see for instance Innaccone (1992) and Berman (2000).
2Among the more notable papers in this strand, see for instance Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001).
1the military, administrative and palace hierarchies routinely being held by converts to
Islam from the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
In this paper, I exploit the Ottomans’ unique imperial history to examine the
inﬂuence of state ideologies versus that of ethno-religious ties in perpetuating or diverting
conﬂicts and war. Whereas Gaza is put forward as the reason why the Ottomans initiated
more conﬂicts in the West, and why on the eastern fronts, more conﬂicts were started
by its rivals, another–not necessarily mutually exclusive–hypothesis claims that the
Imperial Harem wielded considerable political power in Ottoman aﬀairs. And various
historians have suggested that the members of the Harem with diﬀerent ethnic or religious
backgrounds often lobbied the Sultan to inﬂuence the geography of Ottoman conquests.3
Using a comprehensive dataset on conﬂicts and war in the Middle East, Europe
and North Africa for the period between 1401 C. E. and 1700 C. E., I ﬁnd that Gaza was
important for Ottomans’ imperial motives but it was not suﬃcient. What also mattered
almost as much was the sultans’ ethno-religious identities. In particular, while Ottoman
conquests were predominantly in the West until the mid-1500s, I show that the ethnic
background of Valide Sultan ( t h eq u e e nm o t h e r )w a sa ni m p o r t a n ta n di n d e p e n d e n t
determinant of whether the empire engaged in military conquests in Europe versus North
Africa or the Middle East. Depending on the empirical speciﬁcation, the reign of a
sultan with a European maternal ethnic background was enough to oﬀset more than
70 percent of the empire’s western orientation in imperial conquests. In contrast, the
sultan having a European matrilineal descent mostly had no discernible inﬂuence on the
empire’s eastern conﬂicts. If it mattered at all, though, a European maternal genealogy
stimulated Ottomans’ wars in the east, which were overwhelmingly, if not solely, fought
against other Muslim co-religionists.
It is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to discern how general these results are. But,
as some level, they are a testament to the deep roots of ethnic and religious identities.
That is because conversions to Islam, even and particularly among the elite of the Harem
hierarchy who had inﬂu e n c eo nO t t o m a np o l i c y m a k i n g ,s e e mn o tt oh a v eb e e ne n o u g h
to maintain loyalty to the “Holy cause”. The ethno-religious identities of the Sultans’
inner circle originally played a signiﬁcant and independent role in subverting the imperial
ambitions of the empire toward the Middle East and North Africa. It is on this basis
that one can account for the distinct geographical patterns of and shifts in the Ottomans’
history of imperial conquest.
In addition to the literatures referenced above, the work below relates to various
3For example, see Peirce (1993), Imber (2002), Goﬀman (2002) and Shaw (1976).
2strands in economics and political economy. To start with, we know fairly well that dif-
ferences of religion have been important for conﬂict. As Richardson (1960) has shown,
diﬀerences of Christianity and Islam, have been causes of wars and that, to a weaker
extent, “Christianity incited war between its adherents.” Similarly, Wilkinson (1980)
has claimed that “the propensity of any two groups to ﬁght increases as the diﬀerences
between them (in language, religion, race, and cultural style) increase.” The corollary
of such ﬁndings were in fact articulated earlier by the likes of Montesquieu, Kant and
Angell. Their ‘liberal peace’ view emphasized that “mutual economic interdependence
could be a conduit of peace.” Counter-arguments to this view have involved various
negative consequences, such as exploited concessions and threats to national autonomy
emanating from asymmetric interdependence (Emmanuel, 1972 and Wallerstein, 1974).
The empirical evidence is mixed, with earlier studies such as Polachek (1980) and Po-
lachek et al. (1999) ﬁnding that bilateral trade ties reduced conﬂict whereas Barbieri
(1996) and Barbieri-Schnedier (1999) showing that they raised it. Most recently, how-
ever, Lee and Pyun (2008) have provided evidence in favor of the conﬂict-dampening
role of bilateral economic ties, particularly among geographically-contiguous states.
Next, we have the political economy literature on the determinants of conﬂict and
war on the one hand versus production on the other. The notion that appropriation
and violent conﬂict over the ownership for resources should be modeled as an alterna-
tive to economic production was originally articulated by Haavelmo (1954) and further
developed by follow-up papers such as Hirshleifer (1991), Grossman (1994), Grossman
and Kim (1995), Grossman and Iyigun (1995, 1997), Skaperdas (1992, 2005), Alesina
and Spolaore (2007) and Hafer (2006). The work below sits at the junction of these two
strands since it examines the role of religion in inﬂuencing conﬂict and war.
There is also an active strand in economics which emphasizes religion, social norms
and culture as important factors in individual behavior and social organization. The main
focus of some papers is religion and culture in general (e.g., North, 1990, Iannaccone,
1992, Temin, 1997, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2002, Fernandez et al. 2004, Fernandez, 2007,
Barro and McCleary, 2005, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006, and Spolaore-Wacziarg,
2006). Other papers in this line emphasize how individual behavior and the evolution of
various institutions interact with adherence to a speciﬁc religion, such as Judaism, Islam
or diﬀerent denominations within Christianity (e.g., Greif, 1993, 1994, 2006, Botticini
and Eckstein, 2005, 2007, Kuran, 2004a, 2005, Arrunada, 2005, Iyigun, 2008). The work
below relates to this strand since it examines how the interplay between institutional state
objectives and rulers’ personal motives inﬂuenced religiously-motivated and sustained
international conﬂicts.
3Finally, there is a nascent but burgeoning subﬁe l dw i t h i nd e v e l o p m e n ta n de c o -
nomic growth that has documented the role of leadership in economic performance and
political stability (e.g., Jones and Olken, 2005, 2007). What follows complements these
papers because it documents how leadership inﬂuenced the politics and actions of a his-
torically important empire which left a lasting sociopolitical and economic imprint in
eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I provide the
historical background. In Section 3, I present the baseline ﬁndings. In Section 4, I
expand upon the main results. In Section 5, I conclude.
2. Historical Background
2.1. The Ottoman Empire & Its Conquests (1299 C. E. — 1699 C. E.)
Anatolia became a breeding ground for many small feudal states after the demise of the
Sel¸ cuk Turkish Empire at the end of the 13th century. The Ottoman tribe (beylik)w a s
one of these states, being founded by Osman I around the Anatolian city of Eski¸ sehir in
1299. Osman moved the capital of his ﬂedgling settlement soon after its foundation to
Bursa, 82 miles northwest of Eski¸ sehir, and rapidly consolidated his power dominating
the other Anatolian derebeyliks. With the exception of an interregnum period between
1402 and 1413, which began when the Empire collapsed after Tamerlane decimated the
Ottoman army, the Empire grew fairly steadily and rapidly during the 14th and 15th
centuries. According to standard historiography, the Ottomans’ era of political and
military dominance covers the period between its conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul)
in 1453 and the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.4
When one examines the Ottomans’ geographical patterns of conquest, it is not
diﬃcult to discern the empire’s westward orientation from its foundation running through
the reign of Beyazid II, later giving way to more frequent conquests in the Middle East
and North Africa in much of the 16th century, during the reigns of Selim I (the Grim)
and Suleyman I (the Magniﬁcent).
Maps 1 through 4 show Europe, the Middle East and North Africa at the turn of the
14th, 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, respectively. As can be seen in Map 3, even as late as
1500 C. E., the Ottomans controlled only parts of Asia Minor in the east, although they
had full sovereignty in all of the Balkans and a signiﬁcant chunk of southeastern Europe
too. In particular, by the end of the 16th century, the Ottomans had conquered the city
4With this treaty, Ottomans ceded most of Hungary, Transylvania and Slovania to Austria, Podolia
to Poland and most of Dalmatia to Venice. According to Shaw (1976, p. 224), the agreement marked
the Ottomans’ transition from the “oﬀensive to the defensive.”
4of Istanbul (in 1453) thereby ending the East Roman (Byzantine) Empire; had gained
important military victories against Hungary in central Europe (such as the capture of
Belgrade in 1521 and the Mohacs Battle victory in 1526); had established a garrison
in Otranto on the Italian Peninsula (in 1481); and had put the capital of the Austrian
Monarchy, Vienna, under what eventually turned out to be the ﬁrst of two unsuccessful
sieges (in 1529).5 Within another century, however, the Ottomans had primarily turned
eastward for imperial expansion. As shown in Map 4, all of the Arabian peninsula and
most of North Africa–with the notable exception of the northwestern coastal regions
remaining under the control of Kingdom of Morocco–were under Ottoman rule by 1600
C. E. And, as Map 5 shows, the era of decline had formally begun within another century
when the Ottomans lost for the ﬁrst time a signiﬁcant amount of real estate with the
signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.
[Maps 1 through 5 about here.]
In Iyigun (2008), I document and quantify the geography of Ottoman expansion
in some detail. But, in any event, I shall revisit this issue in Section 4.
2.2. The Harem, Sultans & Some Genealogy
The Imperial Harem, harem-i h¨ umayˆ un, was the sacred, private quarters of the Ottoman
sultan, who was “God’s shadow on earth.”6 Throughout the middle of the 16th century,
the imperial harem consisted only of an administrative quarter which was inhabited only
by males, including the Sultan himself and the top echelons of the palace hierarchy.
Towards the end of the century, however, when another private quarter to house the
immediate family of the sultans was established, it too began to be called the imperial
harem. This inner sanctum included the wives and concubines of the Sultan as well as
his imperial oﬀspring.
That Ottoman imperial wives and mothers played an inﬂuential role in shaping,
directly or indirectly, Ottoman administration and practices is well established. For
instance, Stanford Shaw (1976, p. 24) states this quite explicitly when he discusses the
inﬂuence of the wives and queen mothers on Ottoman policy-making: “Beginning in the
Seljuk times and continuing into the fourteenth century, Byzantine and other Christian
women were taken in to the harems of Seljuk, Turkoman and early Ottoman rulers. The
mother of the Seljuk ruler Izuddin II was the daughter of a Greek prince. Izuddin II
5For detailed references on the history of the Ottoman Empire, see Faroqhi (2004), Kinross (1979),
Inalcik (1973), Karpat (1974), Shaw (1976), and Goodwin (2000).
6Peirce (1993, pp. 5 — 7, 17, 24).
5is said to have been secretly baptized a n dt oh a v ef o l l o w e ds t r o n gG r e e ki n ﬂuence at
his court. Orhan’s wife Theodora, daughter Cantacuzene, is said to have remained a
Christian and to have provided help to the Christians of Bithynia while she was in the
Ottoman court. Murat I and Bayezit I had Christian Greek mothers. Murat married the
Bulgarian princess Tamara and the Byzantine princess Helena. Bayezit married Despina,
the daughter of the Serbian prince Lazar. All these women brought Christian advisers
into the Ottoman court, inﬂuencing Ottoman court practice and ceremonial as it evolved
in this crucial [14th] century.”
Peirce (1993, pp. 6, 7) describes in more detail how the harem hierarchy was
typically controlled by the mother queen, Valide Sultan: “The imperial harem was much
like the household harem, only much more extensive and with a more highly articulated
structure... The larger the household, the more articulated the power structure of the
harem.” Invariably, but more so after the 16th century, the harem hierarchy functioned
under the control of the mother queen, Valide Sultan. More to the point, her inﬂuence
transcended the harem boundaries because the empire itself was accepted as the personal
domain of the royal family. According to Peirce (1993, p. 7), for example, “Women of
superior status in this female [harem] society, the matriarchal elders, had considerable
authority not only over other women but also over younger males in the family, for the
harem was also the setting for the private life of men... The authority enjoyed by the
female elders transcended, in both its sources and its eﬀects, the bounds of the individual
family. In a polity such as the Ottomans, where the empire was considered the personal
domain of the dynastic family, it was natural that important women within the dynastic
household–in particular, the mother of the reigning sultan–would assume legitimate
roles of authority outside the royal household.”
While the institutional powers of the Valide Sultan solidiﬁed with the establishment
of the inner sanctum of the imperial harem in mid-16th century, she exerted inﬂuence
over the eventual Sultan long before that. Again, referencing Peirce (1993, p. 24), “From
t h em i d d l eo ft h eﬁfteenth century, and possibly earlier, when a prince left the capital for
his provincial governorate, he was accompanied by his mother, whose role was to preside
over the prince’s domestic household and perform her duty of “training and supervision”
alongside the prince’s tutor. But when the queen mother emerged as an institutionally
powerful individual toward the end of the sixteenth century, there were two generations
of “political mothers” related to the single politically active make of the dynasty, the
sultan... With the lapse of the princely governorate, the entire royal family was united
in the capital under one roof, rather than, as previously, dispersed throughout the royal
domain. There was now only one royal household, over which the senior woman, the
6sultan’s mother, naturally took charge.”
Goﬀman (2002, pp. 124-25) takes exception to the canonical account of the imper-
ial women: according to such historiography, the era of “the sultanate of women” which
roughly spanned the period between the mid-16th century to mid-17th century, was a
manifestation of the decline of the empire. To Goﬀman, however, the prominence of
Valide Sultans in Ottoman state aﬀairs was more of a statement about the maturity and
preparation of the sultans: “Many voices... echoed this condemnation of female med-
dling in politics; many commentators both contemporary and modern considered this
trend ruinous. There is another way to consider the situation, however. The imperial
prince’s mother’s principal task long had been the training and protection of her son.
In the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries her job was ﬁnished when her well-prepared and
grown-up oﬀspring defeated his brothers and gained the sultanate. In the seventeenth
century, however, when her ill-prepared son became sultan despite youth or the incom-
petence spawned by a lifetime of seclusion, it can be argued that it was appropriate that
the valide sultan remained as his guide.”
It is important to establish next that Ottoman throne successions were deliber-
ately non-institutionalized and highly random events. The only established rule was
unigeniture and, starting in the 1450s, infracticide. 7 Goﬀman (2002) states “[When one
sultan died], one of his sons, rather than his many brothers and sons, succeeded him...the
road toward unigeniture remained rocky, its institutionalization a matter of luck as well
as strategy. Beyazid, for example, probably was able to eliminate his competent elder
brother Yakub with ease because it was Beyazid who in 1389 was on the battleﬁeld at
Kosovo when his father fell...Yakub, meanwhile, had the misfortune to be far away in
Anatolia.” Peirce (1993) makes this point even more succinctly when she declares “...the
history of Turkish states, the Ottomans included, demonstrates a number of options for
succession, none of them regarded as illegitimate or unconstitutional... However, the
prevailing tendency in most Turkish states was to avoid restrictions on eligibility and
to regard all males as having a claim to eligibility for succession. In theory, the will
of God, who had bestowed sovereignty on the dynastic family, would determine in each
generation which of its scions should emerge victorious.”
Imber (2002, p.98) goes a step further to ascribe the resilience of the Ottoman
empire to its two principles of succession: “The ﬁrst, which seems to date from the
earliest days of Ottoman rule, was that Ottoman territory was indivisible. The sons of
Beyazid fought each other to the death rather than split up the lands that remained
7Inalcik (1973). For more details on the Ottoman succession struggles between 1300 and 1650, also
see Imber (2002, pp. 96 - 115).
7to them after Timur’s victory. The second principle was that none of the sultan’s heirs
enjoyed primacy in the succession. The sultanate passed to whichever one of them could
eliminate the competition... Ottoman subjects were, it seems, prepared to accept as
ruler almost any legitimate heir to an Ottoman sultan, without regard to any order of
precedence.”
Finally, an essential observation for our pursuit is that the royal oﬀspring were
predominantly born to concubines who were themselves slaves captured in various non-
Muslim domains and converted to Islam. Imber (2002, p. 89) notes, for instance that
“Throughout its history, the Ottoman dynasty continued to reproduce through slaves,
but between the fourteenth and early sixteenth centuries it was also the custom to restrict
each consort’s reproductive life to a single son. ” While the maternal genealogical links of
sultans’ are somewhat debated, most credible accounts conﬁrm that, with the exceptions
of at most ﬁve of the nineteen sultans who ruled over the empire during the three centuries
between the 15th and 17th centuries, all Sultans had non-Turkish maternal origins.
Table 1 lists a genealogical map of all Ottoman sultans between 1400 C. E. to 1700
C. E. In the three centuries on which we shall focus below, the empire had nineteen
sultans. Of those, 5 were Turkish, 3 were Venetian and the rest were Polish (2), Greek
(2), Serbian (2), Albanian (2), Bosnian (2) and Russian (1). Some of these genealogical
links are debated and contested, as there are various claims about the maternal ethnic
ancestors of some of these sultans. For instance, an alternative claim about the maternal
genealogy of Mehmed II is that he had a Serbian mother instead of Turkish; that of
Beyazid II is attributed to Serbian or French in some sources, instead of Albanian. A
second hypothesis for the ancestry of Suleyman I involves a mother of European descent
rather than a Turkish/Crimean one. The last column of Table 1 lists the alternative
genealogy of each sultan, if he has one. In what follows, I shall adhere to the ﬁrst
genealogical classiﬁcation although, later on, I shall also discuss how alternative classiﬁ-
cations impact the main ﬁndings.
[Table 1 about here.]
If the imperial harem exerted a signiﬁcant amount of political and familial inﬂuence
in Ottoman aﬀairs and the Valide Sultan, whose genealogical background varied, was the
top of the hierarchy, a natural question to ask is whether and to what extent the political
and familial inﬂuence of the imperial harem played a role in Ottomans conquests. In fact,
even without the Ottoman Harem inﬂuencing political and military aﬀairs, the sultans
themselves could have been impartial to their ethnic and genealogical backgrounds in
deciding Ottoman military plans. All of this playing out, of course, against the backdrop
8of the Gaza ideology deﬁning the imperial objective of the empire from its foundation.
In the next section, I empirically test the role of sultans’ genealogical links vis-a-vis the
empire’s stated mission of Gaza against the west.
3. The Empirical Analysis
3.1. Ethnic Lineage, Politics & Ottoman Wars (1401 C. E. — 1700 C. E.)
The primary source of the empirical work is the Conﬂict Catalog being constructed by
Brecke (1999). It is a comprehensive dataset on violent conﬂicts in all regions of the
world between 1400 C. E. and the present. It contains a listing of all recorded violent
conﬂicts with a Richardson’s magnitude 1.5 or higher that occurred during the relevant
time span on ﬁve continents.8 While the Catalog is still under construction, it is virtually
complete for Europe, North Africa and the Near East. It is this portion of the catalog
that I rely on below.
For each conﬂict recorded in the catalog, the primary information covers (i) the
number and identities of the parties involved in the conﬂict; (ii) the common name for
the confrontation (if it exists); and (iii) where and when the conﬂict took place. On the
basis of this data, there also exists derivative information on the duration of the conﬂict
and the number of fatalities, which is available for less than a third of the sample.
Supplementary data come from a variety of sources: for population measures, I use the
estimates by McEvedy and Jones (1978) and, for genealogical background data, I rely
on Peirce (1993) and http://turkboard.com.
Using these data, I generate 300 annual observations for the period between 1401 C.
E. and 1700 C. E. I obtain the impact of ethnic identities on Ottoman military conquests
by estimating the following equation:
OTTOWARt = λ0 + λ1EUROMOMt + λ2Xt + εt,( 1 )
where OTTOWARt is one of four alternative dependent variables described below, and
EUROMOMt is a dummy variable for whether the sultans had a European maternal
genealogical link.
8Brecke borrows his deﬁnition for violent conﬂict from Cioﬃ-Revilla (1996): “An occurrence of
purposive and lethal violence among 2+ social groups pursuing conﬂicting political goals that results in
fatalities, with at least one belligerent group organized under the command of authoritative leadership.
The state does not have to be an actor. Data can include massacres of unarmed civilians or territorial
conﬂicts between warlords.”
Richardson’s index corresponds to 32 or more deaths (log32 = 1.5) and the ﬁve continents covered
are all those that are inhabitable (i.e., Europe, Asia, the Americas, Australia, and Africa).
9In various alternative empirical speciﬁcations, the dependent variable, OTTOWARt,
will be: (1) the number of newly-initiated conﬂicts between the Ottoman Empire and
European powers at time t, OTTOMANt; (2) the count at time t of the newly-initiated
number of Ottoman conﬂicts with its non-European foes, OTHEROTTOMANt;( 3 )t h e
aggregate number of conﬂicts the Ottoman Empire had with continental Europeans at
time t (both those which began at time t and those began earlier), AGOTTOt;a n d( 4 )
the aggregate number of Ottomans conﬂicts with its non-European foes, AGOTHERt.9
While the central justiﬁcation for using (1) and (2) is quite straightforward, that for
(3) and (4) is provided by two factors: One, we would like to identify whether the sultans’
ethnic backgrounds aﬀected not only the immediate and pending confrontations, but
also the longer running ones. Two, warfare in the medieval and pre-industrial eras was a
highly seasonal activity, with longer-running hostilities typically coming to a halt during
the winter months, only to be picked up again with the onset of warmer weather in the
spring. In this sense, all unresolved military confrontations were renewed every year. In
any case, if matrilineal genealogical links did matter for the Ottomans’ conquest patterns,
then we would expect λ1 to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant for speciﬁcations in
which (1) and (3) are the dependent variables. As a corollary, we would also expect λ1
to be positive and statistically signiﬁc a n t ,o ra tl e a s t ,i n s i g n i ﬁcant, for speciﬁcations in
which (2) and (4) are the dependent variables.
The dependent variables are comprehensive: they include all Ottoman conﬂicts on
record (including naval battles) with their rivals in Europe, the Middle East and North
Africa. Classifying Ottoman confrontations by geographic region can be complicated
because of the ambiguities of deﬁning the border of the European continent vis-a-vis
Asia.10 For practical purposes, I divide the Eurasian landmass roughly vertically with
reference to Istanbul (the Ottoman capital), and consider Ottomans’ involvements to
t h ew e s to ft h a td i v i s i o nt ob ei nE u r o p ea n dt ot h ee a s to fi tt ob ei nA s i a( h e n c e ,a s
elsewhere).11
In all the empirical tests below, the control variables Xt include a time trend,
9To conﬁrm the validity of this empirical speciﬁcation using annual conﬂict data, I employed the
Dickey-Fuller test for cointegration. At a signiﬁcance level of one percent, I rejected the existence
of a unit root in all four dependent variables, OTTOMANt, OTHEROTTOMANt, AGOTTOt and
AGOTHERt.
Also, in neither of the main speciﬁcations reported below, I could reject the null of no autocorrelation
using the Durbin-Watson d statistic.
10See, for example, Findlay and O’Rourke (2007, p. 2).
11Accordingly, Ottomans’ various Crimean, Muscovy and Russian engagements are classiﬁed as
OTHEROTTOMAN, while those with and in Lithuania, Moldavia and Poland are categorized as
OTTOMAN. These classiﬁcation choices do not have an eﬀect on the conclusions presented below.
10TIME; the lagged dependent variable, OTTOWARt−1; estimates of the Ottoman and
European population levels, OTTOPOPt and EUROPOPt; and an indicator variable
for each of the three centuries, CENTURYt.
Depending on the parsimony of the empirical speciﬁcation I employ and various
alternative estimates, other control variables in Xt are: the age at which the sultans
ascended the throne, ASCENDAGE; dummy variables for each Sultan’s period of reign;
a dummy variable to denote whether period t is before or after the Lepanto Seat Battle in
1571, LEPANTOt; and, the length of reign of the sultan at time t, REIGNLENGTHt.
A time trend is included because there has been a secular decline in warfare in
Europe since the 15th century.12 I include LEPANTO to examine if the Ottomans’
patterns of military activity were altered following their ﬁrst decisive defeat against
European allied forces in 1571. I control for the age at which the sultan ascended the
throne, ASCENDAGE,a sw e l la sh i sl e n g t ho fr e i g n ,REIGNLENGTH,t oi d e n t i f y
if those had systematic discernible eﬀects on Ottoman military activities.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics and the correlation matrices. There are
various interesting facts to highlight here. First, there was roughly one Ottoman military
engagement with Europeans every three years, while there was one with non-Europeans,
including domestic uprisings, every ﬁv ey e a r s . T h en i n e t e e nO t t o m a ns u l t a n sw h i c h
reigned over the empire between 1400 and 1700 ascended the throne around 22 years
of age and remained at the helm for an average of about 14 years. We conﬁrm that
Ottoman rulers were predominantly born to concubines who were slaves of mostly east
European descent: as indicated by the averages for EUROMOM and TURKMOM,t h e
empire was under the rule of a sultan with a European matrilineal descent for roughly
127 years, in contrast to the 115 years when it was ruled by a sultan with a Turkish
maternal genealogical background.
Turning to the correlation matrices, we note that the Ottomans’ European military
engagements were positively associated with the sultan having a Turkish matrilineal de-
scent, the age at which he ascended the throne as well as how long he remained in charge.
The empire’s military engagements elsewhere,i nc o n t r a s t ,w e r eo n l yw e a k l yl i n k e dt ot h e
maternal genealogy of the sultan, although sultans who ascended the throne at an older
age were more likely to have engaged in Ottoman military conﬂicts elsewhere, with those
remaining at the helm longer being less likely to engage foes outside Europe. Note also
that the correlations of Ottomans’ European confrontations and those elsewhere show
clearly opposite trends, with the former declining over time and the three centuries and
12See, for instance, Woods and Baltzly (1915), Richarsdon (1960), Wilkinson (1980), Brecke (1999)
and Lagerl¨ of (2007).
11the latter increasing with time and the passage of each century.
[Table 2 about here.]
T a b l e3r e po r t st h eb a s e l i n ee s t i m a t e sw h e r et h ed e pe n d e n tv a r i a b l ei sOTTOMANt,
the number of newly-initiated conﬂicts between the Ottomans and continental Euro-
peans in year t. As in the three tables that follow, I report OLS estimates with
heteroskedasticity-corrected (robust) errors in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 and
Probit regressions (negative binomial) with robust errors in columns (4) through (6).13
Columns (1) and (4) present results of the most-parsimonious speciﬁcation, in which
only the maternal ethnicity of the sultan, the lagged-dependent variable, the European
and Ottoman population levels and time as well as century trends are included. In
both columns, the coeﬃcient estimates on the maternal ethnic genealogy of the sultan’s
mother, EUROMOM, is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level
or higher. This is in favor of the view that the sultans’ ethnic backgrounds mattered in
Ottoman wars, with a European maternal link oﬀsetting the empire’s underlying western
imperial orientation. In fact, the impact of EUROMOM on Ottoman conﬂicts was re-
markably large: taking the estimate of −.221 in column (1) and the average value of the
Ottomans’ European wars over the sample period, which was .31, these estimates suggest
that a European matrilineal tie reduced the Ottomans’ military ventures in Europe (or
against them) by more than 70 percent. And the estimate in column (4) generates a
very similar but smaller decline of about 60 percent.14 As for the other control variables
in the column (1) and (4) regressions, there was a clear, negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant time trend in the Ottomans’ European military engagements, according to the
coeﬃcient estimates for TIME and CENTURY. In addition, the European popula-
tion level shows a positive and signiﬁcant impact on our dependent variable. Since the
population levels were rising fairly steadily over this time frame, this is also indicative
of some partial oﬀset in the declining time trend of Ottomans’ European conﬂicts.
Columns (2) and (5) add the age at which the sultans took charge, the duration
of their reigns as well as a dummy for the Lepanto Sea Battle in 1571. As can be seen
in the two columns, neither of these variables exert a statistically meaningful impact
on the propensity of Ottomans to engage in conﬂicts with Europeans, although the
13Probit regressions are designed primarily for count data that are discreet and have a preponderance
of zeros and small values, such as my dependent variables.
14The dependent variable in Poisson regressions is in logs. This implies that the dependent variable,
logOTTOMANt, drops by .862 when the sultan’s mother was of a European ethnic background. Thus,
evaluated at the mean of log(.31), this produces a reduction in the Ottomans’ European conﬂicts of
roughly .18 in levels, which corresponds to about a 60 percent drop.
12matrilineal background of the sultan being European or not still makes a statistical
diﬀerence. If anything, the magnitude impact of EUROMOM on lowering the empire’s
military engagements with Europeans is now somewhat larger.
Finally, columns (3) and (6) include a break down of the maternal ethnic links into
ﬁve distinct classiﬁcations: sultans with Turkish descent, TURKMOM, Polish descent,
POLISHMOM, Venetian descent, VENETIA NMOM,B a l k a nd e s c e n t ,BALKAN —
MOM,a n d ,R u s s i a nd e s c e n t ,RUSMOM. Of the 19 sultans who ruled the empire be-
tween 1400 and 1700, ﬁve had Turkish descent, two had Polish backgrounds, three others
h a dV e n e t i a nd e s c e n t ,e i g h th a dB a l k a nd escent and one had Russian heritage. These
two speciﬁcations provide further detail as to how maternal genealogical links aﬀected
Ottoman conquests. In both columns (3) and (6), the coeﬃcient on TURKMOM is
statistically signiﬁcant, positive and quite large, with an overall impact that is in excess
of 95 percent.15 In contrast, according to those same estimates shown in columns (3) and
(6), sultans whose mothers were of Venetian descent, i.e., Murad III, Mehmed III and
Mustafa II, were statistically much less likely to engage in European conquests. In fact,
given the magnitudes of the negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates on
VENETIA NMOM,w es e et h a tValide Sultans with Venetian descent could account
for altogether eliminating Ottoman-European confrontations.
[Table 3 about here.]
In Table 4, I re-estimate the regression shown in Table 3, this time using, AGOT
— TO,t h en u m b e ro fall longer-running confrontations of Ottomans with the Europeans
(those began at date t as well as those which began earlier, but that were continuing
at that time), as the dependent variable. Two important observations can be made by
comparing the results in Tables 3 and 4. First, the qualitative nature of the results are
very similar in both tables: the European ethnic identity of the queen mother exerts
a statistically signiﬁcant and negative impact on AGOTTO in all four speciﬁcations in
Table 4, while a Turkish matrilineal background accounts for a signiﬁcant and positive
impact on AGOTTO in the two estimates shown in columns (3) and (6). Second, the
OLS estimates shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 indicate magnitudes of the ethnic
15The average number of Ottoman-European violent confrontations was .310 over the whole sample
period. Hence, the linear estimate in column (3) produces an increase of more than 96 percent in these
conﬂicts.
In column (6) the dependent variable in Poisson regressions is in logs. This implies that the dependent
variable, logOTTOMANt, increases by 1.29 with a Turkish matrilineal heritage. Thus, evaluated at
t h em e a no fl o g ( .31), this produces an increase in the Ottomans’ European conﬂicts of roughly .80 in
levels, which corresponds to about a 250 percent rise.
13maternal eﬀects to be on the order of about 20 percent.16 This is some empirical support
for the fact that the genealogical maternal background of the sultans primarily inﬂuenced
the initiation of wars between the Ottomans and Europeans and not necessarily their
continuation. In fact, when we turn to the estimates shown in columns (4) and (5)
of Table 4, we deduce that the impact of EUROMOM on the aggregate number of
Ottoman-European wars was again roughly equal to 20 percent.17 A n di nc o l u m n s( 3 )
and (6), we identify that a Turkish maternal genealogy produced a boost of anywhere
between 105 percent to 190 percent in Ottomans’ conﬂicts with European foes.18
[Table 4 about here.]
As we shall next see, things were quite diﬀerent as far as the Ottomans’ confronta-
tions with other parties were concerned. Table 5 reports the baseline estimates when
the dependent variable is OTHEROTTOMANt, the number of newly-initiated conﬂicts
between the Ottomans and non-European entities in year t. Recall that this variable is
not conﬁned to Ottomans’ international wars in the Middle East, North Africa or in
the Caucasus only; it also includes Ottomans’ domestic civil discords and uprisings in
various parts of the empire.19 As shown in columns (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6), we have
no support for the idea that the matrilineal descent of the sultans had any inﬂuence
on the Ottomans’ conﬂicts with non-Europeans. This stands in stark contrast to the
results shown in the comparable columns of Table 3, where EUROMOM depressed
Ottomans’ European military ventures by something on the order of 60 to 70 percent
and TURKMOM stimulated them at least 95 percent. The OLS estimate presented in
column (3) yields slightly diﬀerent estimates in that TURKMOM shows a statistically
signiﬁcant and positive impact on Ottomans’ conﬂicts with non-European parties too.
This ﬁnding is in line with the positive impact of TURKMOM on Ottomans’ wars with
16Recall that the mean number of Ottoman-European conﬂicts over this time span was 1.37 confronta-
tions per year. Thus, the coeﬃcient estimate of −.265 in the ﬁrst column corresponds to about a 19
percent drop, while that of −.333 in the second column equals about a 24 percent decline in AGOTTO.
17Again, the dependent variable in Poisson regressions is in logs. This implies that the dependent
variable, logOTTOMANt, drops by .202 with EUROMOM, according to the column (4) estimate.
Thus, evaluated at the mean of log(1.37), this produces a reduction in the Ottomans’ European conﬂicts
of roughly .25 in levels, which corresonds to about an 18 percent drop. The estimate in column (5) yields
a slightly higher magnitude impact which is on the order of 20 percent.
18In column (6), note once more that the dependent variable AGOTTO is in logs. This implies that
the dependent variable, logAGOTTOt, rises by .746 when the sultan’s mother was of a Turkish ethnic
lineage. Hence, evaluated at the mean of log(.31), this produces an increase in the Ottomans’ European
conﬂicts of roughly .33 in levels, which corresonds to about a 105 percent increase.
19Excluding Ottomans’ internal uprisings and succcession wars does not materially aﬀect the results
Id i s c u s sh e r e .
14Europeans. Note, however, that even if the impact of Turkish matrilineal descent was
positive on Ottoman wars in the east as well as the west, its role in stimulating wars
on Ottomans’ eastern frontiers was about half of that in generating wars on the western
front.
[Table 5 about here.]
The ﬁnal set of baseline estimates are shown in Table 6. As the dependent variable,
they involve AGOTHER,t h en u m b e ro fall longer-running confrontations of Ottomans
with its foes elsewhere. These results are much in line with those reported in Table 5
in qualitative terms. In particular, EUROMOM has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the total
number of Ottomans’ conﬂicts with foes in the Middle East, Anatolia or North Africa.
And breaking down the matrilineal backgrounds of the sultans, as I have done in columns
(3) and (6), produces no signiﬁcant impact for any of the ﬁve categories of geographic
matrilineal descent.
[Table 6 about here.]
With respect to the other control variables included in Tables 3 through 6, there
are some interesting regularities worth pointing out. First, TIME and CENTURY
typically come in with negative signs. In sixteen of the 24 estimates shown in those four
tables, TIME has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on Ottomans’ war with
European as well as non-European foes. Likewise, CENTURY carries a signiﬁcant and
negative coeﬃcient in thirteen of those 24 regressions. In the next subsection, I will
discuss the signiﬁcance of these estimates for the main conclusions.
Another interesting estimate is provided by the age at which the sultans ascended
the Ottoman throne, ASCENDAGE. In all speciﬁcations where the dependent variable
is Ottomans’ European conﬂicts, this variable comes in with a positive coeﬃcient and,
in two regressions, it is also statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, ASCENDAGE enters
negatively in all speciﬁcations where the dependent variable is Ottoman-non-European
confrontations and it yields signiﬁcance in two estimates. Taken together, these ﬁndings
suggest that sultans who took the Ottoman helm at older ages were more likely to engage
European foes as opposed to those on the eastern frontiers. Finally, the length of reign of
each sultan seems to have played no role in inﬂuencing the empire’s western campaigns,
but it had a statistically strong and negative impact in all six speciﬁcations where the
dependent variable was OTHEROTTOMAN. This implies that longer tenures served
to dissuade sultans from engaging non-European, mostly coreligionist foes on the eastern
fronts.
153.2. Alternative Speciﬁcations & Robustness
The empirical ﬁndings above show quite a strong patte r ni nh o wt h ee t h n i cg e n e a l o g i c a l
links of the Ottoman sultans factored in the empire’s patterns of conquest and war.
I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eh a v es e e ns o m ec o n s i s t ent and strong support for the idea that,
while the empire might have been built on the foundations of a Gaza ideology,t a r g e t i n g
Christian Europe in the name of Holy War, either the harem politics or the ethnic identity
of the sultan himself directly were strong enough to negate or propagate the empire’s
westward orientation for conﬂict and imperial conquest. That noted, there are various
empirical and conceptual issues that need to be dealt with regarding the results we have
reviewed thus far.
To start with, is it possible that the maternal ethnic link variables are picking up
a time trend, because most sultans had Turkish maternal ties early on and they had
non-Turkish and often European genealogical ties later in the sample period? Indeed,
a ss h o w ni nT a b l e1 ,ﬁve of the seven sultans who were in power in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e
sample period were of Turkish maternal descent. But it is important to acknowledge in
this context that, in a majority of the estimates shown in Tables 3 through 6, both TIME
and CENTURY yield typically signiﬁcant and almost always negative coeﬃcient values.
Thus, the impact of the maternal histories of the sultans on the patterns of Ottoman
war and conﬂict is their direct eﬀects which are above and beyond those captured by our
two time trends.
Second, are there possible channels of reverse causality? Given the discussion in
subsection 2.2, this is highly unlikely. As I have already noted in detail, Ottoman throne
successions were deliberately non-institutionalized and highly random events. In this, it
is fairly acceptable to think that the patterns of Ottoman confrontations in the east and
the west had little to no inﬂuence on who among the sultans’ sons managed to accede
the Ottoman throne.
That noted, there is one channel through which Ottomans’ external confrontations
could have inﬂuenced the matrilineal background of the sultans:20 g i v e nt h a te a c hs u l t a n
acceded the throne at about 22 years of age, there is a chance that the Ottomans’ wars
with European or non-Europeans in any given period are correlated with their conﬂicts
roughly twenty two years ago. If the Ottoman harem likely consisted of a larger portion
of whomever they were defeating in war, then it is more likely that the mother of a
sultan who began to rule the empire roughly two decades later had an ethnic tie to those
foes. Thus, if whom the Ottomans engaged militarily in a given period had a (negative)
20Thanks to Jared Rubin who ﬁrst pointed out this scenario.
16correlation with whom they might have confronted two decades prior, the estimates
above would be biased. In order to account for this possibility, I reran the estimates
shown in Tables 3 through 6 with the 22-year lagged value of the left-hand-side variables
as an additional control variable. The negative impact of EUROMOM on OTTOMAN
was retained. Its insigniﬁcant role in OTHEROTTOMAN was not altered either, so I
have chosen not to report these estimates here.
Another important issue involves the degree of uncertainty in the ethnic lineage of
some of the sultans. As shown in Table 1, there are alternative hypotheses for the ethnic
lineage of three Ottoman sultans, Mehmed II, Beyazid II and Suleyman I. In addition,
there are some doubts about the lineage of two other rulers, Selim I and Murad III,
although no clear alternatives have been established for their backgrounds. To examine
the extent to which these classiﬁcations might have aﬀected the baseline results, I created
some alternative ethnic lineage series in which I use the ethnic background alternatives
for Mehmed II, Beyazid II and Suleyman I. Note, however, that these alternative claims
make a diﬀerence for only Mehmed II (with his Turkish ethnic maternal link switching
to European) and Suleyman I (with his maternal lineage of Turkish Crimean becoming
European, speciﬁcally Balkan). Beyazid II, in fact, has two alternatives for his primary
maternal background, which is Albanian. However, neither of the two alternatives of Ser-
bian and French aﬀect a change in his EUROMOM status. Due to these observations,
I created nine alternative maternal background series for EUROMOM, TURKMOM
and BALKANMOM: in three of them, I altered Mehmed II’s alternative ethnic lineage
only; in the next three, I changed Suleyman I’s ethnic background only; and in the ﬁnal
three, I switched the maternal ethnic histories of both Mehmed II and Suleyman I.
Some of the results generated with these alternative maternal genealogical series are
shown in Table 7 where the dependent variables are OTTOMAN and OTHEROTTO
— MAN in alternating fashion, respectively. In the ﬁrst two columns, the ethnic back-
ground variables reﬂect the change in Mehmed II’s status only; in columns (3) and (4),
they reﬂect the alternative for Suleyman I only; and in the ﬁnal two columns, the ethnic
background variables are comprehensively revised. As can be seen in columns (1), (3) and
(5), the change in classiﬁcation makes the conﬂict-augmenting impact of TURKMOM
weaker only when the backgrounds of both sultans are revised. Even in that case, how-
ever, the alternative TURKMOM enters with the predicted positive sign and with a
p-value of 11 percent in column (5). In all three speciﬁcations where the dependent
variable is OTTOMAN (i.e., columns (1), (3) and (5)), we see that RUSMOM also
h a dap o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant impact on Ottomans’ European conﬂi c t s ;t h i si sp e r f e c t l y
consistent with the baseline results in Table 3. On the downside, BALKANMOM now
17plays a signiﬁcant and positive role in stimulating Ottoman-European confrontations in
two of the three speciﬁcations shown in columns (1), (3) and (5). For this result, how-
ever, the alternative ethnic background of Mehmed II seems to be the driving inﬂuence,
because switching the matrilineal heritage of Suleyman I does not produce this eﬀect, as
s h o w ni nc o l u m n( 3 ) .
Turning to the impact of changes in matrilineal status on OTHEROTTOMAN,
which are shown in the even numbered columns of Table 7, we ﬁnd that none of the
matrilineal descent variables except VENETIA NMOMenters signiﬁcantly. The latter
had a positive impact on producing more conﬂicts between the Ottomans and its non-
European foes on the eastern frontiers in all three estimates, with a signiﬁcant estimate
in column (6) and p-values of 13 and 12 percent in columns (2) and (4), respectively.
[Table 7 about here.]
In Table 8, I repeat the above robustness check using CUMOTTO and CUM —
OTHER as the dependent variables, again in alternating fashion. As in the previous
table, the ethnic background variables in columns (1) and (2) reﬂect the change in
Mehmed II’s status only; those in the next two columns consider the alternative for
Suleyman I only; and those in the last two columns are based on the alternatives for
Mehmed II and Suleyman I together. The general pattern of ﬁndings here is much in
line with what we have seen above. In particular, sultans whose matrilineal descent was
Turkish account for a positive and signiﬁcant impact on creating Ottoman-European
wars in the aggregate (i.e., wars including those which began in a given year as well as
those that were a continuation from earlier years). This was the case in all three estimates
shown in columns (1), (3) and (5). A change in the status of Suleyman I is quite benign
in that, in column (3), only TURKMOM comes in with the predicted sign and all other
ethnicity variables are insigniﬁcant. The switch in Mehmed II’s matrilineal status is
more problematic in that it produces a statistically signiﬁcant and positive impact of
some ethnic European backgrounds, namely for POLISHMOM and BALKANMOM.
The estimates shown in columns (2), (4) and (6) reveal that the impact of maternal
genealogical links on CUMOTHER is quite robust to all possible changes in matrilin-
eal status. Moreover, VENETIA NMOM now enters signiﬁcantly and positively in
columns (2) and (6) and, when it is not signiﬁcant in column (4), it sill yields a positive
eﬀect with a p-value of 19 percent. In columns (2) and (4), none of the other matrilin-
eal backgrounds played a signiﬁcant role in Ottomans’ wars with its non-European foes
in aggregate; this is consistent with the results shown in Table 6 and in line with the
main hypothesis examined here. The major diﬀerence vis-a-vis results shown in Table
186 is that, in column (6) of Table 8, two other matrilineal dummies, TURKMOM and
RUSMOM, also generate positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on CUMOTHER.
[Table 8 about here.]
Although I have chosen not to report them here, I also examined the extent
to which the alternative matrilineal genealogies inﬂuenced the empirical results when
EUROMOM is utilized as the sole maternal background variable. When I did so, I
found results that were qualitatively quite in line with those shown in Tables 7 and 8.
That is, EUROMOM continued to have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
Ottomans’ conﬂicts with Europeans when Suleyman I’s maternal background is altered
only. But changes in neither Suleyman I nor Mehmed II’s maternal lineage inﬂuenced
t h er o l eo fEUROMOM in Ottomans’ conﬂicts with non-Europeans; EUROMOM re-
mained insigniﬁcant for determining violent confrontations between the Ottomans and
its rivals in the Middle East, North Africa and Anatolia.
To summarize, for three of the nineteen sultans who ruled the Ottoman Empire
over the three centuries between 1400 C. E. and 1700 C. E., there are some alternative
claims regarding their ethnic maternal links. Relying on the alternative hypothesis for
the maternal link of Suleyman I has no signiﬁcant qualitative impact on the baseline
results, although entertaining the option for Mehmed II produces some conﬂicting ﬁnd-
ings. Even when we conﬁne our attention to the alternatives for both sultans, however,
we can still establish the following: Various maternal ethnic links might have positively
inﬂuenced Ottomans’ European campaigns, but TURKMOM almost always did. In
some other cases, the maternal backgrounds from eastern Europe played a positive role
too, in contradiction to the main hypothesis examined above. In terms of the Ottomans’
confrontations on its eastern frontiers, most maternal ethnic lineages did not factor in,
although a maternal link of European origin, VENETIA NMOM,s e e m st oh a v ep o s i -
tively aﬀected such Ottoman conﬂicts. More broadly, EUROMOM still had a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on Ottomans’ conﬂicts with Europeans and it remained
insigniﬁcant for determining violent confrontations between the Ottomans and its rivals
elsewhere.
Next, I checked the extent to which the sample time period inﬂuences the central
ﬁndings. In Table 9, I replicate the Poisson estimates originally presented in Tables 3
and 5 using two alternative cuts of the data: in the ﬁrst three columns, the dependent
variable is OTTOMAN for the 250-year interval between 1451 and 1700; in columns
(4) through (6), it is OTTOMAN for the interval between 1451 and 1650. These esti-
mates conﬁrm that shortening the analysis period to cover 1451 to 1700 or 1451 to 1650
19has no major impact on the ﬁndings that EUROMOM typically depressed Ottomans’
European military ventures.21
[Table 9 about here.]
As an alternative inquiry, I removed all of the maternal ethnicity dummies and
included dummies for the reign of each sultan instead.22 Doing so helps to isolate the ﬁxed
eﬀects of each sultan who ruled the Ottoman empire between the 15th and 18th centuries.
As right-hand side control variables, all of the estimates included TIME, CENTURY,
OTTOPOP, EUROPOP, ASCENDAGE,a n dREIGNLENGTH in addition to the
thirteen dummy variables for sultans. I regressed OTTOMAN and OTHEROTTO —
MAN on these explanatory variables. For Ottomans’ European conﬂicts, only Mehmed
II, Suleyman I and Mehmed IV entered with statistically signiﬁcant signs and they were
all positive. Of those Ottoman rulers, Mehmed II and Suleyman I had Turkish ethnic
lineages and Mehmed IV had a Russian background. For Ottomans’ eastern frontier
conﬂicts, only Murad III and Mehmed III yielded statistically signiﬁcant signs and they
were both positive. Murad III and Mehmed III both had Venetian matrilineal descent.
And when I reran these regressions with Ottomans’ all wars in the west and the east,
CUMOTTO and CUMOTHER, as the dependent variables, I got similar results. The
exceptions were the positive and signiﬁcant impact of Murad IV on CUMOTTO and
t h en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant inﬂuence of Murad II on CUMOTHER.23
As a ﬁnal line of exploration, I also tested the extent to which matrilineal heritage
aﬀected the duration of Ottomans’ wars with Europeans and non-Europeans. In partic-
ular, I ran the estimates shown in Tables 3 and 5, this time using the average length of
Ottomans’ European wars in any given period and their wars elsewhere with others as
two alternative dependent variables. A sample of my main ﬁndings is shown in Table 10.
Now we have a total of 76 observations when we regress the average length of Ottoman-
European conﬂicts on the explanatory variables due to the fact that there were conﬂicts
between the Ottomans and Europeans in 76 of the 300 years in the sample. For the same
21Ih a v ea l s oc h e c k e dt h er o b u s t n e s so fﬁndings when OTHEROTTOMAN is the dependent variable.
I have chosen not to report those results here, but the ﬁndings were generally consistent with those shown
in Table 4. While in some speciﬁcations EUROMOM attained negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, the
magnitude of the eﬀects were always smaller than those estimates where the dependent variable was
OTTOMAN.
22The only restriction I imposed is that a sultan had to be at the helm for at least ﬁve years. On this
basis, Mustafa I (r. 1617-18, 1622-23), Osman II (r. 1618-22), Suleyman II (r. 1687-91) and Ahmed II
(1691-95) were excluded.
23Clustering errors by the reign of each sultan did not inﬂuence ﬁndings either. All results that are
not shown are available upon request.
20reason, there are 46 observations when the average duration of Ottomans’ non-European
conﬂicts is used as the dependent variable. As shown in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5),
EUROMOM h a dap o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant impact on lengthening the duration of Ot-
tomans’ European confrontations, whereas it had no discernible eﬀect on its conﬂicts
with non-European foes. One can only speculate as to why EUROMOM had opposite
eﬀects on the duration and number of Ottomans’ European wars. But one possibility
might be that European matrilineal links depressed the initiation of Ottoman conﬂicts
in Europe but, conditional on the fact that they began, such ties helped to produce a
stalemate instead of a typically outright Ottoman victory. The comparison of columns
(3) and (6) show that it was the Russian maternal link that signiﬁcantly reduced the
length of Ottoman-European confrontations, whereas Polish and Venetian mothers had
a positive impact on Ottomans conﬂicts elsewhere.
[Table 10 about here.]
4. Discussion
I shall conclude this paper by making some observations that relate to the analyses
above.
First, the average magnitude of the eﬀects of maternal lineage, say for EUROMOM,
is quite large. It implies that, while Ottomans engaged its European foes once every three
years on average, they did so once every decade when a sultan with a European matrilin-
eal descent was at the helm. To put this in further context, and as I have shown in Iyigun
(2008), of the 93 Ottoman-European military conﬂicts, 63 were historically documented
to be initiated by the Ottomans (roughly about 68 percent), but only 17 out of 52 of the
Ottomans confrontations with other sovereigns and groups elsewhere (including Anato-
lia) were instigated by the empire itself (about 33 percent).24 Even more remarkable is
t h ef a c tt h a tm o s to ft h eO t t o m a n s ’E u r o p e a nv entures were front-loaded: in the period
between 1401 and 1550, Ottomans engaged Europeans in 51 conﬂi c t s ;o ft h o s e ,4 0w e r e
begun with some Ottoman initiative (which is close than 80 percent). Thus, when one
factors in the fact that some Ottoman-European wars were initiated by the Europeans
too, the impact of having a European matrilineal descent becomes even larger.
In this context, one ought to also bear in mind that economic and ﬁnancial mo-
tives would not have been major factors in Ottomans’ tendency to primarily target
eastern continental Europe: according to Maddison’s (2001) estimates, eastern Europe
had per-capita incomes of 400 and 462 in 1990 U. S. dollars around 1000 and 1500 C. E.
24There are only a few cases where border skirmishes prior to the conﬂict itself make it harder to
assess how the confrontation began; otherwise this turned out to be a fairly straightforward exercise.
21respectively, whereas his estimates for the geographic regions what are now modern-day
Iran and Egypt for the same periods are 450 and 565, respectively. Hence, the pattern
and timing of Ottoman conﬂicts are consistent with its hypothesized ideology. Nonethe-
less, when pitted against the inﬂuence of “family culture and ties” on aﬄicting conﬂict
and war, the empire’s institutional objectives and motives–as exempliﬁed by Gaza–
seem to have been secondary. In particular, the results above have shown how sultans’
own genealogical backgrounds almost entirely oﬀset the Ottomans’ imperial orientation
and its implicit religious motives.
Second, there are at least two possible channels through which maternal genealogy
might have mattered for Ottomans’ imperials quests. One is in line with the ideas
articulated in the introduction: the Ottoman Imperial Harem was an institution that
played a typically varying but inﬂuential role in determining the empire’s political actions
and the highest member of its hierarchy was the Valide Sultan. Alternatively, it is also
possible that the harem played no role in inﬂuencing the sultan in state matters, but
the sultans acted cognizant of their family legacies. Obviously, the empirical work above
cannot distinguish between these two channels. Nonetheless, it does verify that ethnic
lineage–and perhaps religious identities too–was a strong enough inﬂuence on Ottoman
matters so as to almost completely nullify one of the founding motives of an inherently
Islamic empire.
All the same, we can try to exploit the fact that the private quarters of the imperial
harem were built only in the mid-16th century, around 1566.25 If it was primarily the
political inﬂuence of the harem that drove Ottoman conquests and not the sultans’ ethnic
and cultural matrilineal upbringing, then it is plausible that the queen mothers’ inﬂuence
should have risen after the private harem quarters were built. In Table 11, I present some
negative binomial regression results that reproduce four speciﬁcations shown in Tables
3 and 5. The only exception now is that a dummy variable for the construction of
the private harem quarters, HAREM, as well as its interaction with EUROMOM are
included as additional explanatory variables. As shown, these new variables neither
yield statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects, nor alter the impact of EUROMOM on Ottoman
conﬂicts reported earlier. While this is no doubt cursory, it can be suggestive of the fact
that the sultans’ upbringing mattered more than the queen mothers’ political inﬂuence.26
25Recall that the private quarters of the Ottoman Harem were added later, as a consequence of which
the role of the harem in Ottoman politics is believed to have risen. This is why, for example, Peirce
(1993, ch. 4) labels the era between 1566 and 1656 as the ‘age of the Queen Mother’.
26There is one other possibility which needs to be entertained: since the Janissary corps as well as the
top echelons of the Ottoman military and administration relied on converts to Islam whose origins lay in
conquered lands, it is possible that they–not Valide Sultans nor the Sultans’ ethnicities themselves–
22[Table 11 about here.]
Third, we have the issue of ethnicity versus religion. In particular, is it possible to
say more about whether it was ethnic or religious matrilineal ties that mattered more in
the patterns of Ottoman conquest? At some level, this is obviously diﬃcult to discern
because either the sultans’ mothers were Turkish and Muslim or they were Christian
and non-Turkish (which meant European, with the exception of the Russian Orthodox
mom of Mehmed IV). So it is quite diﬃcult, if not impossible, to dissect whether it was
religious or ethnic ties that aﬀected the sultans’ conquest motives. However, there is a
way by which we can explore if the impact of having moms of Balkan descent depended
on whether or not the mother’s ethnic region was under Ottoman rule. The idea is that,
if it was religion (ethnicity) which mattered more, then the incentive to divert Ottomans
away from Europe ought to have still remained high (declined) after the mothers’ home
regions fell to the Ottomans.
To test this idea, we can in fact interact the queen mothers’ ethnicities with dum-
mies for the dates at which that ethnic region came under Ottoman control (if it did at
all). The downside of this exercise is that, of the maternal ethno-regional backgrounds,
only BALKANMOM (those of Serbian, Greek, Albani a na n dB o s n i a nd e s c e n t )c a m e
under the control of the Ottomans, typically around the mid- to late-15th century during
the reign of Mehmed II (the Conqueror). And only one sultan, Beyazid I, had a mother
of Balkan descent prior to the Balkans being transferred to Ottoman control. All the
same, I report some of the results of an exercise in which the analogs of columns (3) and
(6) of Tables 3 and 5 are estimated. They include the control variable of a dummy for
the period during which the Balkans were under Ottoman control, BALKANINDP,
as well as the interaction of this dummy with BALKANMOM.27 As indicated, the
conﬂict-suppressing role of BALKANMOM in Ottoman-European wars was all the
more important before the region fell under Ottoman control. Equally interesting is the
fact that, for Ottomans’ confrontations with non-Europeans, the conﬂict-propagating
role of BALKANMOM was more pronounced before the region became an Ottoman
territory. In general, I take these results to be suggestive of the idea that ethnicity and
nationalities, but not so much religion, drove some of these results. Alas, given that
account for the changes in the pattern of Ottoman conquests. There are two issues to bear in mind in
this regard. First, we clearly do not have the ethnicity details for the military and palace hierarchies
that we do on those of queen mothers. Second, political power was still concentrated but, nonetheless,
more diluted among the viziers and the top echelons of the Janissary corps. As such, one would expect
less of an impact from the ethnic and religious backgrounds of a member of these hierarchies.
27The dummy BALKANINDP attains the value of 1 during independence from the Ottomans and
0 after conquest.
23these ﬁndings hinge on the rule of only one sultan, Beyazid I, they should be interpreted
with a great deal of caution.
[Table 12 about here.]
Fourth, recall that membership in the Ottoman harem, bureaucracy or public
administration required a Muslim identity. Thus, all wives and queen mothers were either
Muslims at birth or converts to Islam of Christian or Jewish backgrounds.28 In this, we
have some implication that ethnic and religious identities had some latent persistence.
Finally, the role of women in Muslim civilizations in general and the Ottoman
Empire in particular has been extensively debated. Indeed, Peirce (1993) details the
power of imperial women in the Ottoman Harem and other Ottoman historians, such as
Shaw (1976) and Inalcik (1973), also review this topic at some length. The caveat in
the second point above notwithstanding, the empirical analyses discussed here lend some
credence to the view that women–in this case, the queen mothers in particular–had
inﬂuence and extensive power in decision-making.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I rely on the Ottomans’ unique imperial history to examine the inﬂuence
of religion, ethnicity and family ties in perpetuating or diverting conﬂict and war. The
Gaza ideology is generally emphasized as the reason why the Ottomans initiated more
conﬂicts in the West, and why on the eastern fronts, more conﬂicts were started by its
rivals. But according to another, not necessarily mutually exclusive, theory the Imperial
Harem wielded considerable political power in Ottoman aﬀairs.
Using a comprehensive dataset on conﬂicts and war in the Middle East, Europe
and North Africa for the period between 1401 C. E. and 1700 C. E., I ﬁnd that Gaza
was important but not suﬃcient for explaining Ottomans’ imperial motives. What also
mattered almost as much was the sultans’ ethno-religious heritage. In particular, while
Ottoman conquests were predominantly in the West until the mid-1500s, I show that
the ethnic background of Valide Sultan (the queen mother) was an important and in-
dependent determinant of whether the empire engaged in military conquests in Europe
versus North Africa or the Middle East. Depending on the empirical speciﬁcation, the
reign of a sultan with a European maternal ethnic background was enough to oﬀset more
than 70 percent of the empire’s western orientation in imperial conquests. As I have also
28A possible exception was Orhan’s wife, Theodora, who might have retained her religion even after
becoming an imperial wife. However, Orhan is the second Ottoman sultan with his reign corresponding
to a much earlier period before 1400.
24identiﬁed, however, the sultan having a European matrilineal descent mostly had no
discernible inﬂuence on the empire’s eastern conﬂicts. In some rare cases where it played
a role, a European maternal genealogy stimulated Ottomans’ wars in the east.
On this basis, we have found that the religious, ethnic or cultural identities of the
Sultans’ inner circle played a signiﬁcant and independent role in subverting the imperial
ambitions of the empire toward the Middle East and North Africa. Hence, we have
evidence in Ottomans’ history that the rulers’ individual identities as much as those of
their societies more broadly were important in the long run for maintaining conﬂicts,
conquests and wars on ethnic or religious grounds.
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30Table 1: Ottoman Sultans & their Genealogical Links (1400 C. E. — 1700 C. E.)
Ottoman Sultans’ Genealogical Chart
Name Period of Reign Mother’s Name Genealogy Alternative G.
Beyazid I 1389 — 1401 G¨ ul¸ ci¸ cek Hatun Greek —
Mehmed I 1413 — 1421 Devlet Hatun Turkish —
Murad II 1421—1444, 1446—1451 Emine Hatun Turkish —
Mehmed II 1444—1446, 1451—1481 H¨ uma Hatun Turkish Serbian
Beyazid II 1481 — 1512 I. G¨ ulbahar Hatun Albanian Serbian, French
Selim I 1512 — 1520 II. G¨ ulbahar Hatun Turkish ?
S¨ uleyman I 1520 — 1566 Ay¸ se Hafsa Sultan Turkish Balkan
Selim II 1566 — 1574 H¨ urrem Sultan Polish* —
Murad III 1574 — 1595 Nurbanu Sultan Venetian* ?
Mehmed III 1595 — 1603 Saﬁye Sultan Venetian —
Ahmed I 1603 — 1617 Handan Sultan Greek —
Mustafa I 1617—1618, 1622—1623 ? Albanian —
Osman II 1618 — 1622 Mahﬁruz H. S. Serbian —
Murad IV 1623 — 1640 K¨ osem Sultan Bosnian —
˙ Ibrahim I 1640 — 1648 ” ” —
Mehmed IV 1648 — 1687 Turhan Sultan Russian —
S¨ uleyman II 1687 — 1691 Saliha D. Hatun Serbian —
Ahmed II 1691 — 1695 Hatice Muazzez S. Polish* —
Mustafa II 1695 — 1703 E m e t u l l a hR .G .S . Venetian —
Sources: Shaw (1976), Peirce (1993), http://turkboard.com & Turk Vikipedi. ? denotes some degree of uncertainty about
genealogy; — indicates no alternative theories exist and ∗ represents of Jewish decent.
31Map 1: The Ottoman Empire circa 1300 C. E.
Map 2: The Ottoman Empire circa 1400 C. E.
32Map 3: The Ottoman Empire circa 1500 C. E.
Map 4: The Ottoman Empire circa 1600 C. E.
33Map 5: The Ottoman Empire circa 1700 C. E.
34Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and the Correlation Matrix
1401 C. E. — 1700 C. E. The Correlation Matrix
n =3 0 0 Mean St. Dev. OTT OTHR AGOTTO AGOTH TMO EMO RLEN AGE OTP
OTTOMAN .310 .585 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
OTHEROTT. .170 .426 .056 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
AGOTTO 1.37 1.10 .529 .043 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
AGOTHER .507 .641 −.064 .589 −.051 1 ... ... ... ... ...
TURKMOM .383 .487 .169 .072 .239 −.046 1 ... ... ... ...
EUROMOM .423 .495 −.085 .007 −.052 .123 −.676 1 ... ... ...
R.LENGTH 14.0 11.2 .067 −.069 .077 −.134 .273 −.272 1 ... ...
ASCENDAGE 22.2 11.7 .044 .038 .078 −.067 .160 .306 −.027 1 ...
OTTOPOP 16.5 9.00 −.092 .031 −.065 .119 −.573 .459 .017 −.173 1
EUROPOP 89.7 16.8 −.094 .039 −.093 .086 −.519 .403 .078 −.073 .951
1401 C. E. — 1700 C. E. The Correlation Matrix
n =3 0 0 Mean St. Dev. OTT OTHR TIME CENT BMOM PMOM VMOM RMOM
OTTOMAN .310 .585 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
OTHEROTT. .170 .426 .056 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
TIME 150.5 86.7 −.099 .028 1 ... ... ... ... ...
CENTURY 1.00 .816 −.128 .056 .943 1 ... ... ... ...
BALKANMOM .270 .445 −.040 .004 .177 .265 1 ... ... ...
POLISHMOM .040 .196 .008 .038 .144 .083 −.124 1 ... ...
VENET. MOM .113 .318 −.082 −.019 .225 .102 −.217 −.073 1 ...
RUSMOM .130 .337 −.053 −.061 .525 .473 −.235 −.079 −.138 1
TURKMOM .383 .487 .169 .071 −.520 −.508 −.480 −.161 −.282 −.305Table 3: Ethnic Backgrounds & Ottomans’ Newly-Initiated European Wars
Dependent Variable: No. of New Ottoman-European Wars per Year
OLS Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EUROMOMt −.221∗ −.234∗ ... −.862∗ −.995∗ ...
(.087) (.096) (.327) (.427)
TIME −.011∗ −.011∗ −.013∗ −.047∗ −.049 −.061∗∗
(.005) (.006) (.007) (.022) (.026) (.032)
CENTURY t −.347∗ −.331∗ −.467∗ −1.25∗ −1.28∗ −2.08∗
(.130) (.133) (.141) (.440) (.534) (.618)
OTTOPOPt .016 .018 .030∗ .062 .064 .202∗
(.011) (.015) (.015) (.040) (.052) (.064)
EUROPOPt .065∗ .061∗ .065∗∗ .266∗ .275∗ .282∗∗
(.028) (.031) (.035) (.117) (.139) (.159)
OTTOMANt−1 −.018 −.018 −.054 −.073 −.079 −.187
(.056) (.056) (.057) (.160) (.162) (.167)
ASCENDAGEt ... .0016 .005 ... .005 .023∗
(.0036) (.004) (.011) (.010)
REIGNLENGTHt ... .0002 .0001 ... −.003 −.004
(.003) (.0035) (.011) (.011)
LEPANTOt ... .009 .288 ... .139 .792
(.225) (.265) (.705) (.637)
TURKMOMt ... ... .300∗ ... ... 1.29∗∗
(.132) (.713)
POLISHMOMt ... ... .029 ... ... .035
(.251) (1.02)
VENETIA NMOMt ... ... −.362∗∗ ... ... −1.71
(.197) (1.13)
BALKANMOMt ... ... .048 ... ... .223
(.145) (.834)
RUSMOMt ... ... .337∗∗ ... ... 1.96∗∗
(.198) (1.13)
No. of obs. 299 299 299 299 299 299
R2 .045 .045 .081 ... ... ...
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: no. of new
Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Source for the conﬂict data: Brecke (1999).
Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
36Table 4: Ethnic Backgrounds & Ottomans’ Cumulative European Wars
Dependent Variable: No. of All Ottoman-European Wars per Year
OLS Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EUROMOMt −.265∗ −.333∗ ... −.202∗ −.288∗ ...
(.109) (.126) (.092) (.120)
TIME .003 .003 .0038 .0045 .0048 .0068
(.007) (.007) (.0078) (.006) (.0067) (.0061)
CENTURY t −.584∗ −.584∗ −.782∗ −.526∗ −.500∗ −.801∗
(.189) (.189) (.215) (.141) (.154) (.226)
OTTOPOPt .047∗ .041∗ .050∗ .046∗ .052∗ .076∗
(.015) (.020) (.020) (.012) (.017) (.020)
EUROPOPt −.015 −.011 −.023 −.017 −.023 −.039
(.035) (.038) (.038) (.031) (.034) (.031)
AGOTTOt−1 .642∗ .637∗ .576∗ .394∗ .395∗ .335∗
(.047) (.048) (.052) (.032) (.032) (.037)
ASCENDAGEt ... .0040 .0059 ... .006 .0088∗
(.0050) (.0052) (.004) (.0040)
REIGNLENGTHt ... .0006 .0017 ... −.002 −.0020
(.004) (.0047) (.004) (.0038)
LEPANTOt ... .215 .756∗ ... .034 .452∗∗
(.297) (.343) (.214) (.253)
TURKMOMt ... ... .604∗ ... ... .746∗
(.193) (.273)
POLISHMOMt ... ... .325 ... ... .173
(.339) (.370)
VENETIA NMOMt ... ... −.374 ... ... −.196
(.299) (.378)
BALKANMOMt ... ... .166 ... ... .344
(.204) (.298)
RUSMOMt ... ... .365 ... ... .482
(.267) (.322)
No. of obs. 299 299 299 299 299 299
R2 .507 .508 .534 ... ... ...
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: no. of all
Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began or continued in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Source for the conﬂict data:
Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
37Table 5: Ethnic Backgrounds & Ottomans’ Newly-Initiated non-European Wars
Dependent Variable: No. of New Ottoman-non-European Wars per Year
OLS Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EUROMOMt −.091 −.125 ... −.536 −.573 ...
(.071) (.097) (.419) (.558)
TIME −.011∗ −.011∗ −.010∗∗ −.063∗ −.051∗ −.053
(.005) (.006) (.006) (.025) (.025) (.041)
CENTURY t .109 .029 .114 .547 .164 .715
(.103) (.105) (.122) (.677) (.758) (.811)
OTTOPOPt −.004 .008 .003 −.032 .034 .009
(.009) (.012) (.012) (.056) (.071) (.068)
EUROPOPt .057∗ .057∗ .054∗ .323∗ .281∗ .269∗
(.023) (.026) (.030) (.142) (.140) (.209)
OTHEROTT.t−1 −.046 −.067 −.074 −.283 −.385 −.429
(.057) (.055) (.055) (.389) (.382) (.385)
ASCENDAGEt ... −.0001 −.0021 ... −.0025 −.016
(.0029) (.0036) (.018) (.021)
REIGNLENGTHt ... −.0057∗ . − .0063∗ ... −.029∗∗ −.031∗
(.0027) (.0029) (.016) (.016)
LEPANTOt ... −.203 −.227 ... −1.18 −1.14
(.165) (.171) (.932) (.849)
TURKMOMt ... ... .174∗∗ ... ... 1.49
(.094) (1.13)
POLISHMOMt ... ... .150 ... ... 1.53
(.213) (1.53)
VENETIA NMOMt ... ... .157 ... ... 1.50
(.192) (1.53)
BALKANMOMt ... ... .042 ... ... .771
(.134) (1.33)
RUSMOMt ... ... .178 ... ... 1.39
(.176) (1.55)
No. of obs. 299 299 299 299 299 299
R2 .032 .049 .057 ... ... ...
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: no. of new
Ottoman-non-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Source for the conﬂict data: Brecke
(1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
38Table 6: Ethnic Backgrounds & Ottomans’ Cumulative non-European Wars
Dependent Variable: No. of All Ottoman-non-European Wars per Year
OLS Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EUROMOMt −.050 −.084 ... −.113 −.352 ...
(.095) (.125) (.252) (.369)
TIME −.013∗ −.017∗ −.019∗ −.030∗ −.035∗ −.051∗
(.005) (.006) (.007) (.013) (.014) (.021)
CENTURY t .002 −.125 .015 −.156 −.703∗∗ −.210
(.125) (.124) (.141) (.265) (.397) (.427)
OTTOPOPt .014 .010 .0035 .025 .040 .032
(.012) (.017) (.018) (.024) (.041) (.040)
EUROPOPt .062∗ .092∗ .100∗ .152∗ .203∗ .274∗
(.030) (.034) (.037) (.072) (.076) (.108)
AGOTHERt−1 .541∗ .513 .494∗ .801∗ −.764∗ .734∗
(.060) (.062) (.065) (.097) (.097) (.099)
ASCENDAGEt ... −.005 −.0079∗∗ ... −.010 −.022∗∗
(.0037) (.0046) (.008) (.012)
REIGNLENGTHt ... −.006∗ −.0078∗ ... −.020∗ −.022∗
(.003) (.0033) (.010) (.009)
LEPANTOt ... −.046 −.245 ... −.211 −1.09∗∗
(.237) (.242) (.553) (.634)
TURKMOMt ... ... .062 ... ... .109
(.132) (.415)
POLISHMOMt ... ... .067 ... ... −.063
(.324) (.952)
VENETIA NMOMt ... ... .321 ... ... .922
(.268) (.862)
BALKANMOMt ... ... −.0043 ... ... −.070
(.203) (.667)
RUSMOMt ... ... .182 ... ... .759
(.232) (.762)
No. of obs. 299 299 299 299 299 299
R2 .371 .383 .394 ... ... ...
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: no. of all
O t t o m a nv e r s u sn o n - E u r o p e a nc o n ﬂicts that began or continued in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Source for the
conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
39Table 7: Speciﬁcations with Alternative Matrilineal Links I
Dependent Variable: No. of New Ottoman-European Wars per Year, (1), (3), (5);
No. of New Ottoman-non-European Wars per Year, (2), (4), (6).
Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TIME −.042∗ −.041 −.045∗∗ −.044 −.041 −.048∗
(.168) (.036) (.028) (.416) (.029) (.019)
CENTURY t −1.42∗ .746 −1.54∗ .786 −1.01∗ .042
(.463) (.668) (.511) (.737) (.449) (.379)
OTTOPOPt .179∗ .005 .198∗ .031 .197∗ .020
(.067) (.069) (.066) (.076) (.068) (.041)
EUROPOPt .161 .210 .195 .236 .107 .244∗
(.142) (.173) (.135) (.174) (.139) (.096)
DEPVARt−1 −.127 −.395 −.154 −.448 −.152 .746∗
(.168) (.382) (.166) (.416) (.168) (.103)
ASCENDAGEt .016 −.021 .018 −.024 .027∗ −.018
(.013) (.022) (.011) .021) (.014) (.011)
REIGNLENGTHt .007 −.031∗ .0045 −.031∗∗ .011 −.020∗
(.011) (.016) (.106) (.016) (.011) (.008)
LEPANTOt .235 −1.73∗ −.153 −2.31∗ .557 −1.00∗∗
(.668) (.810) (.779) (.854) (.720) (.585)
TURKMOMt 1.35∗∗ 1.46 1.26∗∗ 1.48 1.18 −.112
(.738) (1.13) (.725) (.1.15) (.740) (.414)
POLISHMOMt 1.07 1.83 .431 1.21 1.49 .187
(.978) (1.44) (1.12) (1.65) (.969) (.871)
VENETIA NMOMt −.414 2.12 −.940 1.70 −.038 1.23∗
(1.02) (1.38) (1.13) (1.59) (1.00) (.602)
BALKANMOMt 1.32∗∗ 1.42 .735 .842 1.81∗ .237
(.748) (1.17) (.839) (1.35) (.738) (.443)
RUSMOMt 2.47∗ 1.67 1.93∗∗ 1.11 3.22∗ 1.03
(.1.05) (1.49) (1.08) (1.67) (1.09) (.717)
No. of obs. 299 299 299 299 299 299
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1), (3) and (5) dependent
variable: no. of new Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Cols. (2), (4) and (5)
dependent variable: no. of new Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Source for
the conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
40Table 8: Speciﬁcations with Alternative Matrilineal Links II
Dependent Variable: No. of All Ottoman-European Wars per Year, (1), (3), (5);
No. of All Ottoman-non-European Wars per Year, (2), (4), (6).
Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TIME .013∗ −.046∗ .009 −.049∗ .013∗ −.132∗
(.006) (.019) (.006) (.020) (.006) (.036)
CENTURY t −.502∗ .011 −.686∗ −.183 −.432∗ −1.48∗∗
(.186) (.369) (.190) (.392) (.186) (.813)
OTTOPOPt .070∗ .037 .085∗ .043 .065∗ .220∗
(.019) (.042) (.020) (.049) (.019) (.095)
EUROPOPt −.083∗ .240∗ −.049 .268∗ −.096∗ .555∗
(.031) (.096) (.031) (.100) (.032) (.174)
DEPVARt−1 .349∗ .747∗ .337∗ .735∗ .332∗ −.255
(.035) (.099) (.036) (.099) (.037) (.170)
ASCENDAGEt .0079∗∗ −.022∗∗ .0075∗ −.023∗ .012∗ .049∗
(.0045) (.011) (.0039) (.011) (.005) (.014)
REIGNLENGTHt .0028 −.021∗ −.0001 −.022 .004 .005
(.0038) (.009) (.0035) (.009) (.004) (.010)
LEPANTOt .099 −1.53∗ −.026 −1.43∗ .430∗∗ .733
(.243) (.676) (.243) (.659) (.261) (.839)
TURKMOMt .658∗ −.028 .708∗ .114 .600∗ 1.11∗∗
(.280) (.409) (.274) (.412) (.276) (.599)
POLISHMOMt .631∗ −.044 .210 −.191 .770∗ −.618
(.350) (.860) (.366) (1.07) (.354) (1.21)
VENETIA NMOMt .359 1.28∗ −.080 .992 .456 1.31∗∗
(.334) (.635) (.360) (.752) (.334) (.891)
BALKANMOMt .801∗ .201 .359 −.061 .971∗ .685
(.281) (.433) (.304) (.626) (.292) (.793)
RUSMOMt .789∗ .928 .405 .725 1.02∗ 3.19∗
(.316) (.697) (.327) (.789) (.336) (1.03)
No. of obs. 299 299 299 299 299 299
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1), (3) and (5) dependent
variable: no. of all Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began or continued in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Cols. (2),
(4) and (5) dependent variable: no. of all Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began or continued in a given year between
1401 - 1700. Source for the conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
41Table 9: Speciﬁcations with Shorter Time Intervals
Dependent Variable: No. of New Ottoman-European Wars per Year, 1451 - 1700, (1) - (3);
No. of New Ottoman-European Wars per Year, 1451 - 1650, (4) - (6).
Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EUROMOMt −.724∗ −.761∗∗ ... −.600∗∗ −.604 ...
(.326) (.456) (.344) (.432)
TIME −.032 −.038∗∗ −.057∗∗ −.054 −.046 −.036
(.023) (.023) (.035) (.045) (.037) (.035)
CENTURY t −.765∗∗ −1.15∗∗ −1.72∗ −.864 −1.18∗ −1.73∗
(.466) (.620) (.644) (.552) (.607) (.710)
OTTOPOPt .090∗ .093 .198∗ .073 .063 .121
(.044) (.059) (.068) (.088) (.128) (.127)
EUROPOPt .141 .195 .240 .261 .254 .185
(.128) (.129) (.175) (.213) (.178) (.171)
OTTOMANt−1 −.167 −.198 −.253 −.116 −.138 −.195
(.181) (.187) (.187) (.180) (.184) (.185)
ASCENDAGEt ... −.017 .014 ... −.017 .0027
(.019) (.017) (.020) (.019)
REIGNLENGTHt ... −.014 .0044 ... −.012 −.007
(.013) (.014) (.013) (.015)
LEPANTOt ... −.314 .697 ... −.306 .716
(.924) (.817) (1.09) (.831)
TURKMOMt ... ... −.728 ... ... .661
(.951) (.740)
POLISHMOMt ... ... −1.63∗∗ ... ... −1.43
(.962) (.876)
VENETIA NMOMt ... ... −3.37∗ ... ... −1.72∗
(1.11) (.731)
BALKANMOMt ... ... −1.67∗∗ ... ... −.235
(.993) (.660)
RUSMOMt ... ... −11.9∗ ... ... −20.5∗
(1.68) (1.32)
No. of obs. 250 250 250 200 200 200
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) through (3) dependent
variable: no. of new Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1451 - 1700. Cols. (4) through (6)
dependent variable: no. of new Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1451 - 1650. Source for
the conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
42Table 10: Explaining the Average Duration of Ottoman Conﬂicts
Dependent Variable: Average Length of New Ottoman-European Wars per Year (in months, (1) - (3);
Average Length of No. of New Ottoman-non-European Wars per Year (in months), (4) - (6).
Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EUROMOMt .803∗ .859∗ ... .182 .198 ...
(.407) (.420) (.253) (.287)
TIME .033 .036 .502∗ −.007 −.013 −.031
(.026) (.027) (.241) (.017) (.020) (.029)
CENTURY t −.109 −.345 −1.33 −.805 −.338 .120∗
(.496) (.567) (2.56) (.556) (.514) (.538)
OTTOPOPt .011 .093 −.888∗∗ .035 −.037 −.100∗
(.055) (.079) (.521) (.052) (.047) (.048)
EUROPOPt −.170 −.181 −1.90∗∗ .059 .075 .197
(.146) (.162) (1.11) (.101) (.117) (.149)
DEPVARt−1 −.061∗ −.067∗ −.438∗ −.558∗ −.430∗ −.389∗
(.018) (.020) (.168) (.217) (.212) (.199)
ASCENDAGEt ... −.011 −.132∗ ... .017 −.017
(.014) (.052) (.015) (.014)
REIGNLENGTHt ... −.008 −.056 ... .021∗∗ .010
(.012) (.053) (.012) (.012)
LEPANTOt ... −.537 1.56 ... 1.28∗∗ −.010
(.508) (4.19) (.731) (.916)
TURKMOMt ... ... −2.74 ... ... .596
(3.47) (.475)
POLISHMOMt ... ... 2.36 ... ... 1.28∗∗
(4.79) (.711)
VENETIA NMOMt ... ... 1.86 ... ... 2.31∗
(5.19) (.721)
BALKANMOMt ... ... −.593 ... ... .686
(4.03) (.484)
RUSMOMt ... ... −18.6∗ ... ... .992∗
(8.24) (.618)
No. of obs. 76 76 76 46 46 46
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Cols. (1) through (3) dependent
variable: average duration in months of new Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700.
Cols. (4) through (6) dependent variable: average duration of new Ottoman-non-European conﬂicts that began in a given
year between 1401 - 1700. Source for the conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones
(1978).
43Table 11: Building the Private Quarter of Harem & Queen Mothers’ Role
Dependent Variable: No. of New Ottoman-European Wars per Year, (1) - (2);
No. of New Ottoman-non-European Wars per Year, (3) - (4).
Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (5) (6)
EUROMOMt −.873∗ −.887∗ −1.02 −.829
(.408) (.414) (.666) (.697)
HAREMt .985 1.20 −.282 −.259
(.724) (.769) (.991) (1.16)
HAREMt ∗ EU.MOMt −.668 −.736 1.10 .760
(.642) (.669) (.886) (.934)
TIME −.072∗ −.071∗ −.052∗∗ −.043
(.030) (.033) (.031) (.030)
CENTURY t −1.27∗ −1.15∗ .694 .225
(.444) (.515) (.735) (.870)
OTTOPOPt .049 .053 −.072 .012
(.055) (.064) (.075) (.098)
EUROPOPt .384∗ .369∗ .278 .245
(.154) (.167) (.174) (.157)
DEPVARt−1 −.095 −.100 −.323∗ −.395
(.164) (.168) (.386) (.378)
ASCENDAGEt ... .008 ... −.006
(.011) (.019)
REIGNLENGTHt ... .002 ... −.027
(.012) (.021)
LEPANTOt ... −.076 ... −1.28
(.677) (.934)
No. of obs. 299 299 299 299
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable in cols. (1)
and (2): no. of new Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Dependent variable in
cols. (3) and (4): no. of new Ottoman-non-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Source for
the conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
44Table 12: Timing of Conquests & Queen Mothers’ Role
Dependent Variable: No. of New Ottoman-European Wars per Year, (1) - (2);
No. of New Ottoman-non-European Wars per Year, (3) - (4).
Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (5) (6)
TIME −.056 .061∗∗ −.061 −.055
(.036) (.032) (.050) (.045)
CENTURY t −1.72∗ −2.02∗ .816 .334
(.534) (.626) (.707) (.872)
OTTOPOPt .173∗ .203∗ −.013 −.001
(.060) (.064) (.050) (.075)
EUROPOPt .267 .282∗∗ .290 .284
(.174) (.158) (.246) (.231)
DEPVARt−1 −.159 −.187 −.334 −.416
(.164) (.167) (.376) (.380)
ASCENDAGEt ... .023∗ ... −.014
(.009) (.023)
REIGNLENGTHt ... −.004 ... −.028∗∗
(.011) (.016)
LEPANTOt ... .664 ... −.331
(.876) (1.00)
TURKMOM t 1.40∗∗ 1.29∗∗ .880 1.21
(.729) (.718) (1.07) (1.14)
POLISHMOMt .953 .117 .866 .916
(.989) (1.03) (1.29) (1.54)
VENETIA NMOMt −.604 −1.57 .303 .515
1.01 (1.21) (1.27) (1.51)
BALKANMOMt .744 .306 −.141 .016
(.830) (.876) (1.17) (1.30)
BALKANINDPt .111 .103 −.383 −.653
(.388) (.544) (.619) (.890)
B.MOMt ∗ B.INDPt −19.6∗ −24.6∗ 2.96∗ 2.66∗
(1.12) (1.18) (.611) (.881)
RUSMOMt 2.07∗∗ 2.04∗∗ .472 .667
(1.20) (1.15) (1.49) (1.64)
No. of obs. 299 299 299 299
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable in cols. (1)
and (2): no. of new Ottoman-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Dependent variable in
cols. (3) and (4): no. of new Ottoman-non-European conﬂicts that began in a given year between 1401 - 1700. Source
for the conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source for population data: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
45